

NEW WAYS OF ONTOLOGY – THE WAYS OF INTERACTION

Although Nicolai Hartmann made significant contributions to virtually all areas and disciplines of philosophy, his first and deepest love was ontology.¹ Part of Hartmann's fascination with ontology was due to the fact that at his time the previously considered *philosophia prima* was practically non-existent. As he remarked, ontology fell in a deep sleep after Christian Wolff.² Hartmann certainly tried to awake the sleeping giant and restore its faded glory. Despite his ingenious efforts, ontology is still mostly absent from the philosophical scene. My paper will address some of the questions that this state of affairs gives rise to: Why did Hartmann's prodigious efforts to rebuild ontology not have lasting effects? Why was it that his "new ways of ontology" did not revitalize the old discipline? Could it be that Hartmann's own way of presenting what is new about his ontology made a confusing impression about the real relationship of the old and the new?

Since I have the highest regard for Hartmann's work and nevertheless believe that his own presentation is – at least partially – responsible for possible misunderstandings, I will here attempt to explain his novel contribution in a way different from that employed by him. My strategy will be as follows. In section I, I will present Hartmann's criticism of the old ontology. Section II will bring a brief sketch of his main contributions to ontology. Finally, in section III, I will attempt to clarify Hartmann's "new ways of ontology" by using the model of interaction. If this conception of reality as an interactive process is indeed useful and illuminating, it will both highlight the novelty of his approach and indicate the direction in which this new ontology should be further developed.

1.

Hartmann's "new ways of ontology" stand in a sharp opposition to the old. Although the old ontology traces its origin from Parmenides and other pre-Socratics, it was founded and established by Aristotle through his



formulation of the question concerning being as being.³ While Hartmann never hides his admiration for Aristotle, this does not prevent him from being critical not only of Aristotle but of the entire western tradition.

Hartmann divides the mistakes of the old ontology into those related to its method and those concerning its content. The methodological fallacy is not described by one word but three: apriorism, deductivism, and constructivism. Hartmann finds a common mistake behind all three methodological approaches in their attempts to develop a complete systematic account of the categories of being – not only of the ideal but of real being as well – by “logico-rational” means, and not by analyzing those different specific ways in which being manifests itself. The same mistaken attempt to reconstruct the structure of the entire world from a small number of self-evident premises infects the entire western tradition. Aristotle, according to Hartmann, tried to do this starting with the principle of excluded middle, while Wolff believed that the task can be accomplished by means of the principle of sufficient reason.

This methodological mistake is not accidental. It is closely related to what Hartmann calls mistakes with respect to the content, or – more precisely – to some uncritically grounded assumptions of the old ontology. Perhaps the most deeply rooted among them is the Parmenidian postulation of the ultimate unity of being and thinking. Although this assumption was expressed in many ways, and developed in different directions, its most important implication was that the laws of logic were to be treated as the laws of being. The corollary was that the entire sphere of being had to be intelligible, comprehensible and meaningful.⁴

Hartmann rejects the thesis of the complete identity of the principles of being and the principles of thinking because this purely speculative assertion transcends the limits of possible experience. Moreover, he is convinced that the thesis presupposes more unity in the world than we have a warrant for asserting: granting this thesis, how could we account for the irreconcilable heterogeneity obviously existing in the world?⁵ The second, idealist answer to this question, which reduced principles of being to principles of thinking, Hartmann repudiates because such a standpoint perverts the natural assumption that knowledge of the structure of objects is prior to knowledge of the structure of our thinking about objects.⁶ Finally, Hartmann criticizes even more sharply the third interpretation, according to which the principles of being are merely linguistic, i.e., nothing but the functions of language. While the first interpretation postulates more unity that we can justify, the linguistic turn dodges the crucial question concerning the relation between being and reality; it satisfies itself with internally coherent “language games” and does not even attempt to uncover

the structure of the real world, which both science and philosophy must aim to disclose.⁷

Parmenides' assumption of the complete unity of being and thinking is also responsible, according to Hartmann, for a deeply ingrained tendency toward monism in western thinking. Monism, on his view, "involves prejudice in favor of simplicity",⁸ which set philosophers on a perpetual search for the ultimate – or absolute, or unconditioned – ground (*Urgrund*) or cause (*Ursache*) of all reality. This search also misled philosophers into what Hartmann sometimes singles out as the worst mistake of the old ontology: its tendency to replace being as such with some of the specific categories of being. In his words,

The old theory of being is based upon the thesis that the universal, crystallized in the *essentia* as substantial form and comprehensible as concept, is the determining and formative core of things. Besides the world of things, in which man, too, is encased, there is a world of essences which, timeless and immaterial, forms a kingdom of perfection and higher being.⁹

Since Hartmann consistently opposes the uncritically accepted thesis of the identity of the principles of being and thinking, he attacks with appropriate vigor the view that identifies being in terms of universals, essences or substances. As he denies that being as such must be definable, understandable and rational, he opposes the traditional divisions of being and becoming, of the separation of existence and essence, as well as the old view that the real and the ideal exclude each other. He is also critical of materialism and idealism, claiming that their basic principles of efficient causality and teleology are equally one-sided and exaggerated. Hartmann's surgical knife cuts left and right and does not seem to spare any vestige of the old ontology. What, then, remains to serve as the basis of his new ontology?

2.

The cardinal sin of the old ontology consists in its perpetual attempts to identify being through its various contents and manifestations. Regardless of whether this is done in terms of essence, substance, matter, form, immovable, unchangeable, indivisible, individual, whole, or any other way, Hartmann finds all of these ways to be mistaken.¹⁰ He is firmly convinced that being itself cannot be defined, since it is the most general category we can think and ask about. As the most general category, being is indefinable and partially irrational. This does not imply, however, that it is entirely irrational and indeterminable, for it can be determined indirectly, through its various manifestations (*Besonderungen*). If this is indeed the case, the

proper method of ontology consists in careful and systematic categorical analysis of various manifestations of being.

Hartmann bases his new ontology on three kinds of ontic manifestations: 1. Moments of being (*Seinsmomenten*), which deal with the relationship of *Dasein* (that something is existent and present) and *Sosein* (how it is; its being in a certain way). 2. Ways of being (*Seinsweisen*), which concerns the relationship between the real and the ideal. 3. Modes of being (*Seinsmodi*), dealing with various kinds of modalities. Despite Hartmann's ability to disentangle numerous modal confusions (e.g., those concerning the mistaken identification of *Wircklichkeit* and *Realität*, as opposed to *Idealität*, or those concerning *Dasein* and *Realität*), since his considerations of the first two types of modifications represent more significant contributions to ontology, I will focus on them.

Hartmann's discussion of *Dasein* and *Sosein* represents one of the finest examples of his novel approach to ontology. Unlike his contemporary Heidegger, who limits his preoccupation to the issue of *Dasein*, Hartmann explores the complex dialectic of *Dasein* and *Sosein*.¹¹ His reasoning is motivated by and responds to two old mistakes: (i) of one-sidedly relating essence to the ideal and existence to the real, and (ii) of treating essence and existence as completely separable. According to Hartmann, *Dasein* is not identical with the real, since every ideal is also a *Dasein*. Similarly, *Sosein* cannot be identified with the ideal, since every thing that is real is also a *Sosein*. Moreover, the old concept of essence is not the same as the ideal but is rather a combination of the ideal and a *Sosein*.¹²

After a complex conceptual analysis, Hartmann arrives at the following conclusion. *Dasein* and *Sosein* are the two moments of the same being; the two terms can be logically differentiated, but *Dasein* and *Sosein* cannot be ontologically separated. Despite being deeply interwoven, there is no direct and tautological identity between *Dasein* and *Sosein*, even in the same thing. The relation is rather that the *Dasein* of a certain **A** is at the same time the *Sosein* of a certain **B**, and the *Sosein* of that existent **B** is at the same time the *Dasein* of some **C**. For instance, the *Dasein* of a tree is the *Sosein* of a forest, for without that tree the forest would not be the same. Going further, the *Dasein* of the forest is the *Sosein* of, say, a landscape, the *Dasein* of the landscape is the *Sosein* of the earth, and so on. At the end of the chain, we come to the last member, the world as a whole, of which we can only say that it is (*Dasein*) but not how it is (*Sosein*).¹³ And here we see the difference of Hartmann's treatment in comparison to the old cosmology and theology. Without a proper appreciation of the *Dasein/Sosein* distinction, they perpetually tried to determine the *Sosein* of the world as a

whole by analogy to an individual thing (*res*) and to elevate the *Dasein* of the last link into some kind of higher (absolute, unconditional, etc.) being.

Hartmann avoids the temptations of the old cosmology and theology; yet he wholeheartedly takes on the problem of the unity of the world as a whole. The existence of such a unity is not in doubt; its structure, however, seems to escape us. One important reason for this is that, in the search for this unity, our rationality seduces us by its desire to see the world as completely homogeneous. Hartmann recognizes the inherent limitations of human rationality and argues that the unity of the world can exist only in multiplicity and heterogeneity.¹⁴ Following Aristotle's classification, Hartmann tries to explain the unity of world in terms of four layers or strata (*Schichten*): inorganic, organic, psychic and spiritual. Each ontic level is *sui generis*, and there are inorganic things, which consists of one layer alone. Nevertheless, the strata are not necessarily separated but freely co-exist and co-determine each other. A plant is a combination of the inorganic and the organic, an animal combines the inorganic and the organic with the psychic, and man is a combination of all four levels.

There are ontological categories characteristic of one stratum (e.g., substantiality and causality are characteristic of the corporeal world, but adaptation and purposiveness are the categories of animate nature), and also the categories common to all strata, although varying from one layer to another (for instance, unity and multiplicity, form and matter, identity and difference). The fundamental task of new ontology is to understand these ontological categories and their inter-categorical relationships.¹⁵

The most important inter-categorical relationships are formulated as the four categorial laws: 1. The law of validity: categories have their being as structures of concrete things and apart from these they have no validity. 2. The law of coherence: categories have no isolated existence for themselves, but are determined and united by the whole categorial structure. 3. The law of hierarchical order: categories of the lower strata are contained in the higher, but not the other way around. 4. The law of dependence: the dependence of categories is asymmetrical, with the higher categories dependent on the lower, though their categorial novelty is thereby not limited.

Whatever unity the world has, on Hartmann's view it comes from these categorial laws which display the relationship of homogeneity and heterogeneity in the multiplicity of ontological strata. He thereby refuses to derive the unity of the world and the multiplicity of the strata from one single principle. Nor can Hartmann accept the ultimate superiority of any layer. As he puts it, "the world is not ruled either by spirit or by matter. It

can be ruled neither from above nor from below”.¹⁶ The world is governed and co-determined by all of its layers; it is a unity in plurality.

3.

It is difficult not to feel overwhelmed by the complexity and subtlety of Hartmann’s conceptual map of the different realms of being. The rich detail of his categorial analysis, his exemplary clarity, and his extraordinary ability to consider a problem from all possible points of view are rarely matched in the history of western philosophy. But here, as everywhere, there is a shadow. And in Hartmann’s case the devil is not in analysis but in synthesis; not in its details but in its big pictures. Hartmann is not nearly as patient and careful in developing a broader perspective as he is in working with the minutest detail. Moreover, he himself tends to obscure a big picture when, for instance, he presents his “new ways of ontology” as standing simply opposed to its old counterpart. As a matter of fact, his new ontology has two opponents rather than one. The first is the old ancient and scholastic ontology of substances, essences, and universals that, let us agree with Hartmann, roughly ends with Wolff. But, then, it is not quite correct to claim that ontology falls asleep after Wolff, since the period of German Idealism and later positivism and Neo-Kantianism is not one of indifference but a period openly opposed to any ontology. If not earlier, then certainly with Kant’s Copernican Revolution, the concept of being becomes treated as something derived and reflected, not as original and primary. Kant’s successors find the consideration of being as being to be even more problematic; for them there is no being without a subject, his thinking and his knowing. While Kant still retains some regard for ontology and transforms it into a “transcendental analytic”, his successors more overtly depose ontology in favor of epistemology.¹⁷

Hartmann’s new ontology is a reaction against the Copernican-epistemological turn no less than it is a rebuttal of the ancient-scholastic ontology. In one of his first major works, one in which he turns his back to the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, Hartmann ferociously attacks the primacy of epistemology. Among his major claims expressed there, and later repeated and elaborated in his other ontological works, we can mention only a few: Idealism does not recognize that there are principles of being which are not also the principles of knowing, nor does it realize that objects are indifferent toward being cognized. Against various forms of idealism, Hartmann defends the thesis that cognition consists in the grasping (*Erfassung*) of objects, not in making them, for such objects are independently existing concrete things.

Hartmann thus seems to reverse Kant's Copernican Revolution and change the modern priority of subject over object back to the ancient and scholastic supremacy of object over subject. But we know that Hartmann is uncompromisingly critical of that tradition as well. How, then, is he positioned with respect to these two traditions? To clarify this issue, consider the following two models:

Model 1: The ancient and scholastic view of the priority of object over subject. Being and thinking are not ontological equals. Being is treated as having its own firmly established identity and unity, independent of and indifferent to whether it is known. To be is to be a definite kind of thing. If our thinking is to disclose what being is, it must adjust itself to its properties.

Model 2: The modern view of the epistemological prevalence of subject over object. Being and thinking are not epistemological equals. Thinking has priority over being, insofar as it is more easily accessible than being. In order to be known, being must "adjust" to the structures of thinking. To be is to be an object of possible knowledge; it is to be knowable as a certain kind of thing.

In his desire to distance himself from the Marburg school and idealism in general, Hartmann frequently makes statements that seem to suggest that he would endorse Model 1, but certainly not Model 2. A closer look at some of his central doctrines, however, should make us suspicious whether either of these two models adequately expresses his unique position. Recall, for instance, Hartmann's discussion of *Sosein* and *Dasein*. The whole conception is an attempt to avoid the old doctrine of essences and outline a relational structure of being. What is the *Sosein* of the world as a whole? We cannot say precisely because we do not have anything else, outside the world and more comprehensive than it, *in comparison to which* we can determine what the *Sosein* of the world may be. If Hartmann were to deny it, he would have to return to the very kind of substantial or essential determination of being that he wanted to escape in the first place.

That Hartmann's view does not conform to the first model is even clearer when we remember his doctrine of the four strata. Being and thinking do not stand in any opposition because thinking belongs to one stratum of being. The strata are different, but they are intimately related by complex networks of dependences and conditioning. The main task of new ontology is to reveal and analyze these interdependences and interconnections. In this new ontology, being is the common sphere in which subject and object stand not opposed to, but in interaction with each other. As Hartmann

himself used to say, being is the neutral category including subject and object, and *jenseits* the old realism and modern idealism.¹⁸

To see which options are still open to Hartmann and what lies beyond the opposition of realism to idealism, recall that the Copernican turn consists not of one but of two steps. The first minimizes or even denies the ontological priority of the object over the subject, of being over thinking. The second step establishes a new paradigm by affirming the epistemological priority of the subject over the object, of consciousness and reason over being. We are accustomed to taking both steps together, without pausing to see whether the first needs to be followed by the second. A closer look shows that the first step does not necessarily lead to the second, for it allows for a possibility of an interactive cooperation between the subject and the object. Could it be that Hartmann's view is best captured by this model of the subject-object relationship?

The answer may depend on how we understand the relation of interaction. A preliminary consideration reveals three elementary points that should be kept in mind. (1) Interactive relations are always reciprocal; this is what distinguishes them from one-directional relations such as actions or reactions. This reciprocity can take many forms, depending on the elements involved. We can distinguish, for instance, between interdependence, interchange, intercourse, interlinking, interfusing, interplaying, and so on. (2) Interactions are dynamic, not static, relations. Their conditions, parameters, or even objectives can change with different circumstances and over a period of time, without thereby interrupting the interactive quality of the relations themselves. (3) Interactions can take place between quite heterogeneous elements; homogeneity is not a prerequisite for interaction. We can thus observe interactions between the inorganic and the organic, between the organic and the psychic, or between the psychic and the spiritual, as well as interactions within those different layers of reality.

Although some considerations of his new ontology suggest this third, interactive model, Hartmann clearly and explicitly rejects such an interpretation of the subject/object relation in cognition. He never tires of arguing that being is "overwhelmingly indifferent" to what we think of it. We may attempt to know what being is and even be successful to a certain extent. Nevertheless, Hartmann would insist that knowledge does not modify or condition being. Knowledge does not create its objects. Known objects are more than mere objects. Beyond what is known (*objectum*) there is the unknown (*trans-objective*), and the point of knowledge is precisely to treat objects as things that have being in and by themselves.¹⁹

I am not, however, persuaded by Hartmann's rejection of the interactive or, as he used to say, correlative, nature of the cognitive relation. I can

fully grant to Hartmann that there is a significant difference between an object of cognition and being; not all that is, exists *qua* object. Nor does all being appear; the amount of being may be infinitely larger than that of what appears and is known by us. Nevertheless, this element of natural realism does not show that when something appears and is known by us, the cognitive relation cannot be interactive and correlative.

One of the reasons why Hartmann does not take the interactive model seriously is because he seems to have a too rigid approach to cognition. In his mind only two options can be entertained: either cognition consists in making (creating) objects, or it consists in grasping them unmodified. But certainly there is plenty of logical space in between these two positions; our choices are not limited to these two options. Let us mention some examples to clarify this. Both objects and subjects bring their respective powers and constraints to the cognitive encounter. All objects have relative degrees of plasticity and complexity. A simple curved line is more plastic than an equally simple straight line, and can accordingly be perceived in more ways than a straight line. A geometrical figure is more complex than a straight line, and a larger number of its components will create more resistance to our attempts to grasp them. Similarly, subjects bring their own characteristics, and these range from the richness of their personal and collective background knowledge, to the fluidity or rigidity of subjects' goals, intentions, and expectations. Our cognitions do not consist either in mere reactions to what happens in a detached world, nor are they sufficient conditions of world making. They are the results of our interactions with reality, interactions in which we do not, strictly speaking, directly and exclusively respond to objects; what we respond to and interact with are the relations which they have with other objects and with us. Cognitions are not mere reflections of a predetermined reality but paths traced through this reality.²⁰

Another reason for Hartmann's resistance to the interaction model may come from the traditional isolation of cognition from other forms of human experience. When he discusses various forms of our experience, such as acting, aesthetic experiences, and touching (as opposed to seeing), Hartmann himself emphasizes their multiple interactive aspects. In considering non-cognitive experiences, he has no problem claiming that "every man's initiative is conditioned by a situation, but also shapes that situation", or that "as things are involved in human activity, so is human existence involved in the happenings of things".²¹ But when it comes to cognition, Hartmann suddenly steps back and even denies any possibility of a genuine cognitive correlation. In fact, he repeats his thesis that being is indifferent

to cognition so many times, with such monotonous impressiveness, and supported by so many arguments, that it may make us suspicious.

And if we become suspicious, we may recall Kant's famous remark that "it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, to find out that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention".²² Kant had Plato in mind, but does not this line of reasoning also apply to Hartmann? Perhaps the ontological reality he describes defies his best attempts to understand it in a way that is not interactive or correlative. Could it not be that his "new ways of ontology" are best understood as the ways of interaction?²³

NOTES

¹ Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) dedicated most of the last twenty years of his life to his work on ontology. His most important ontological books of that period are: *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (1935), *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (1938), *Der Aufbau der realen Welt* (1940), *Neue Wege der Ontologie* (1943), and *Die Philosophie der Natur* (1950). Related works also include *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1921), *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* (vol. I 1923; vol. II 1929), *Das Problem des geistigen Sein* (1933), and *Teleologisches Denken* (1944). This is a truly astonishing opus for one thinker!

² *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1948; 4th ed.), XI.

³ See Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 1003a. Aristotle gives two reasons why the ontological question of being as being has priority over all other questions: First, the ontological question has the most general as its object. Second, ontology inquires into the nature of the highest, the divine being. Because of the second reason, Aristotle refers to his first philosophy also as "theology". The term "ontology" was coined only considerably later by one of Descartes' disciples. In Hartmann's rendering, the ontological question of being as being aims at what is the most general, but not at what is the highest. Cf. *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, part I, "Vom Seienden als Seienden überhaupt", pp. 39 ff.

⁴ The classical formulation of this view was offered by Plato; see his *Timaeus*, 28c–31a. In Plato's famous words (29a), "The world has been fashioned on the model of that which is comprehensible by rational discourse and understanding". For further discussion see A. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), and M. Munitz, *The Question of Reality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁵ See Hartmann's *Der Aufbau der realen Welt: Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964; 3rd ed.), pp. 131 ff., and *Neue Wege der Ontologie* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968; 5th ed.), p. 28, where Hartmann claims that, "Not everything in the world of reality, perhaps only the least part of it, is meaningful; nor is understanding the adequate means of comprehension of all types of objects". This book is translated by R.C. Kuhn and published as *New Ways of Ontology* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953); quoting from page 33.

⁶ For the development and defense of this anti-idealistic thesis, see *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1949; 4th ed.), esp. chs. 11–22, and *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, esp. chs. 22–25.

⁷ For this view, in which Hartmann seems to anticipate Wittgenstein's later philosophy, see *Der Aufbau der realen Welt*, pp. 83 ff.

⁸ *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, p. 46 (English translation, p. 57).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8 (English translation, pp. 6–7).

¹⁰ See *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, chs. 5–7. As Hartmann puts it beautifully (p. 71): “This mistake is also the old one: being is confused with a specific category of being; without noticing it, being is identified with totality, just as it was earlier identified with unity, determination, permanence, etc. Therefore, the ontological refutation here has the same form it had before: no less being is a part than a whole, an individual than a universe, a member than a system. The most insignificant grain of dust in the universe is no less being than the universe itself”.

¹¹ Hartmann raises two main objections against Heidegger's approach to ontology in *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger transposes the question of being as being into the question concerning the meaning of being. This approach limits ontology to an analysis of *Dasein* or, in Heidegger's rendering, man's being and survival. Furthermore, this limits being and all understanding of reality to my being, or man's being, and eliminates the spiritual as a separate stratum of reality, because it limits reality to an individual and his consciousness. For Hartmann's criticism of Heidegger, see *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, pp. 43–46.

¹² For further discussion, see *ibid.*, part II, chs. 11–21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 138–139. To clarify this further, consider Hartmann's other example (*ibid.*, p. 139): That Socrates existed, that is part of the *Sosein* of the world. But that the world exists, this is not a *Sosein* of anything else. The world would have been different had Socrates not existed. But is there anything that would be different without the world? Obviously not, concludes Hartmann.

¹⁴ This is the central thesis of Hartmann's books *Der Aufbau der realen Welt* and *Neue Wege der Ontologie*. For useful discussion of Hartmann's thesis, see John E. Smith, “Hartmann's New Ontology”, *Review of Metaphysics* 8:1954, pp. 583–601; and Michael Landmann, “Nicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 3:1942/43, pp. 393–423, esp. pp. 401 ff.

¹⁵ On Hartmann's own formulation of the fundamental tasks of new ontology, see *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, p. 42 (English translation, p. 51).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67 (English translation, p. 84).

¹⁷ For good discussion of Hartmann's criticism of Kant and a partial defense of the latter, see Lewis White Beck, “Nicolai Hartmann's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Knowledge”. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2:1942, pp. 472–500. On Hartmann, Neo-Kantians and Hartmann's contemporaries, see Jacob Taubes, “The Development of the Ontological Question in Recent German Philosophy”, *Review of Metaphysics* 6: 1953, pp. 651–664.

¹⁸ See, for instance, Hartmann's essay “Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus”, *Kant-Studien* 29: 1924, pp. 160–206.

¹⁹ Cf. *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, pp. 75, 176, 394; *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, pp. 56, 96, 154, 159.

²⁰ I develop this interactive conception of knowledge in “Rethinking the Concept of Truth: A Critique of Deflationism”, *The Truth and Its Nature (If Any)*, ed. J. Peregrin (Dordrecht: Kulwer, 1999), pp. 203–221, and in “Paths Traced Through Reality: Kant on Common-

sense Truths”, *Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck*, ed. P. Cicovacki (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), pp. 47–69.

²¹ *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, pp. 207–209.

²² *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), A314/B370.

²³ I am deeply grateful to Nalin Ranasinghe for his suggestions and comments on an earlier version of this paper.